Thin Crispy Pizza Base

Source: https://www.taste.com.au/recipes/thin-crispy-pizza-bases/

INGREDIENTS

  • Olive oil, to grease
  • 250ml (1 cup) lukewarm water
  • 1 teaspoon sugar
  • 2 teaspoons (7g/1 sachet) dried yeast
  • 450g (3 cups) plain flour, sifted
  • 1/4 teaspoon salt
  • 1 tablespoon olive oil
  • 1 140g container pizza sauce, optional

METHOD

  • Step 1 Preheat oven to 220°C. Brush two 25cm pizza trays with oil to grease.
  • Step 2 Combine water and sugar in a small bowl. Sprinkle with the yeast and set aside in a warm, draught-free place for 5 minutes or until foaming.
  • Step 3 Meanwhile, sift flour and salt into a large bowl. Make a well in centre and add yeast mixture and oil. Use a wooden spoon to stir until combined, then use your hands to bring together. (It should be soft and slightly sticky.)
  • Step 4 Turn the dough onto a lightly floured surface and knead for 6 minutes or until almost smooth. Divide the dough in half and cover with a clean damp tea towel. Set aside in a warm, draught-free place for 5 minutes.
  • Step 5 Roll each dough portion out to line greased pizza trays. Spread bases with pizza sauce, if desired. Bake in preheated oven for 8 minutes or until golden and crisp. (To freeze pizza bases, see notes.)

Superiority

Superiority – by Arthur C. Clarke

IN MAKING THIS STATEMENT – which I do of my own free will – I wish first to make it perfectly clear that I am not in any way trying to gain sympathy, nor do I expect any mitigation of whatever sentence the Court may pronounce. I am writing this in an attempt to refute some of the lying reports broadcast over the prison radio and published in the papers I have been allowed to see. These have given an entirely false picture of the true cause of our defeat, and as the leader of my race’s armed forces at the cessation of hostilities I feel it my duty to protest against such libels upon those who served under me.

I also hope that this statement may explain the reasons for the application I have twice made to the Court, and will now induce it to grant a favor for which I can see no possible grounds of refusal.

The ultimate cause of our failure was a simple one: despite all statements to the contrary, it was not due to lack of bravery on the part of our men, or to any fault of the Fleet’s. We were defeated by one thing only – by the inferior science of our enemies. I repeat – by the inferior science of our enemies. When the war opened we had no doubt of our ultimate victory. The combined fleets of our allies greatly exceeded in number and armament those which the enemy could muster against us, and in almost all branches of military science we were their superiors. We were sure that we could maintain this superiority. Our belief proved, alas, to be only too well founded. At the opening of the war our main weapons were the long-range homing torpedo, dirigible ball-lightning and the various modifications of the Klydon beam. Every unit of the Fleet was equipped with these and though the enemy possessed similar weapons their installations were generally of lesser power. Moreover, we had behind us a far greater military Research Organization, and with this initial advantage we could not possibly lose.

The campaign proceeded according to plan until the Battle of the Five Suns. We won this, of course, but the opposition proved stronger than we had expected. It was realized that victory might be more difficult, and more delayed, than had first been imagined. A conference of supreme commanders was therefore called to discuss our future strategy.

Present for the first time at one of our war conferences was Professor-General Norden, the new Chief of the Research Staff, who had just been appointed to fill the gap left by the death of Malvar, our greatest scientist. Malvar’s leadership had been responsible, more than any other single factor, for the efficiency and power of our weapons. His loss was a very serious blow, but no one doubted the brilliance of his successor – though many of us disputed the wisdom of appointing a theoretical scientist to fill a post of such vital importance. But we had been overruled.

I can well remember the impression Norden made at that conference. The military advisers were worried, and as usual turned to the scientists for help. Would it be possible to improve our existing weapons, they asked, so that our present advantage could be increased still further?

Norden’s reply was quite unexpected. Malvar had often been asked such a question – and he had always done what we requested.

“Frankly, gentlemen,” said Norden, “I doubt it. Our existing weapons have practically reached finality. I don’t wish to criticize my predecessor, or the excellent work done by the Research Staff in the last few generations, but do you realize that there has been no basic change in armaments for over a century? It is, I am afraid, the result of a tradition that has become conservative. For too long, the Research Staff has devoted itself to perfecting old weapons instead of developing new ones. It is fortunate for us that our opponents have been no wiser: we cannot assume that this will always be so.”

Norden’s words left an uncomfortable impression, as he had no doubt intended. He quickly pressed home the attack.

“What we want are new weapons – weapons totally different from any that have been employed before. Such weapons can be made: it will take time, of course, but since assuming charge I have replaced some of the older scientists with young men and have directed research into several unexplored fields which show great promise. I believe, in fact, that a revolution in warfare may soon be upon us.”

We were skeptical. There was a bombastic tone in Norden’s voice that made us suspicious of his claims. We did not know, then, that he never promised anything that he had not already almost perfected in the laboratory. In the laboratory – that was the operative phrase.

Norden proved his case less than a month later, when he demonstrated the Sphere of Annihilation, which produced complete disintegration of matter over a radius of several hundred meters. We were intoxicated by the power of the new weapon, and were quite prepared to overlook one fundamental defect – the fact that it was a sphere and hence destroyed its rather complicated generating equipment at the instant of formation. This meant, of course, that it could not be used on warships but only on guided missiles, and a great program was started to convert all homing torpedoes to carry the new weapon. For the time being all further offensives were suspended.

We realize now that this was our first mistake. I still think that it was a natural one, for it seemed to us then that all our existing weapons had become obsolete overnight, and we already regarded them as almost primitive survivals. What we did not appreciate was the magnitude of the task we were attempting, and the length of time it would take to get the revolutionary super-weapon into battle. Nothing like this had happened for a hundred years and we had no previous experience to guide us.

The conversion problem proved far more difficult than anticipated. A new class of torpedo had to be designed, as the standard model was too small. This meant in turn that only the larger ships could launch the weapon, but we were prepared to accept this penalty. After six months, the heavy units of the Fleet were being equipped with the Sphere. Training maneuvers and tests had shown that it was operating satisfactorily and we were ready to take it into action. Norden was already being hailed as the architect of victory, and had half promised even more spectacular weapons.

Then two things happened. One of our battleships disappeared completely on a training flight, and an investigation showed that under certain conditions the ship’s long-range radar could trigger the Sphere immediately after it had been launched. The modification needed to overcome this defect was trivial, but it caused a delay of another month and was the source of much bad feeling between the naval staff and the scientists. We were ready for action again – when Norden announced that the radius of effectiveness of the Sphere had now been increased by ten, thus multiplying by a thousand the chances of destroying an enemy ship.

So the modifications started all over again, but everyone agreed that the delay would be worth it. Meanwhile, however, the enemy had been emboldened by the absence of further attacks and had made an unexpected onslaught. Our ships were short of torpedoes, since none had been coming from the factories, and were forced to retire. So we lost the systems of Kyrane and Floranus, and the planetary fortress of Rhamsandron.

It was an annoying but not a serious blow, for the recaptured systems had been unfriendly, and difficult to administer. We had no doubt that we could restore the position in the near future, as soon as the new weapon became operational.

These hopes were only partially fulfilled. When we renewed our offensive, we had to do so with fewer of the Spheres of Annihilation than had been planned, and this was one reason for our limited success. The other reason was more serious.

While we had been equipping as many of our ships as we could with the irresistible weapon, the enemy had been building feverishly. His ships were of the old pattern with the old weapons – but they now out-numbered ours. When we went into action, we found that the numbers ranged against us were often 100 percent greater than expected, causing target confusion among the automatic weapons and resulting in higher losses than anticipated. The enemy losses were higher still, for once a Sphere had reached its objective, destruction was certain, but the balance had not swung as far in our favor as we had hoped.

Moreover, while the main fleets had been engaged, the enemy had launched a daring attack on the lightly held systems of Eriston, Duranus, Carmanidora and Pharanidon – recapturing them all. We were thus faced with a threat only fifty light-years from our home planets.

There was much recrimination at the next meeting of the supreme commanders. Most of the complaints were addressed to Norden-Grand Admiral Taxaris in particular maintaining that thanks to our admittedly irresistible weapon we were now considerably worse off than before. We should, he claimed, have continued to build conventional ships, thus preventing the loss of our numerical superiority.

Norden was equally angry and called the naval staff ungrateful bunglers. But I could tell that he was worried – as indeed we all were – by the unexpected turn of events. He hinted that there might be a speedy way of remedying the situation.

We now know that Research had been working on the Battle Analyzer for many years, but at the time it came as a revelation to us and perhaps we were too easily swept off our feet. Norden’s argument, also, was seductively convincing. What did it matter, he said, if the enemy had twice as many ships as we – if the efficiency of ours could be doubled or even trebled? For decades the limiting factor in warfare had been not mechanical but biological – it had become more and more difficult for any single mind, or group of minds, to cope with the rapidly changing complexities of battle in three-dimensional space. Norden’s mathematicians had analyzed some of the classic engagements of the past, and had shown that even when we had been victorious we had often operated our units at much less than half of their theoretical efficiency.

The Battle Analyzer would change all this by replacing the operations staff with electronic calculators. The idea was not new, in theory, but until now it had been no more than a Utopian dream. Many of us found it difficult to believe that it was still anything but a dream: after we had run through several very complex dummy battles, however, we were convinced. It was decided to install the Analyzer in four of our heaviest ships, so that each of the main fleets could be equipped with one. At this stage, the trouble began – though we did not know it until later.

The Analyzer contained just short of a million vacuum tubes and needed a team of five hundred technicians to maintain and operate it. It was quite impossible to accommodate the extra staff aboard a battleship, so each of the four units had to be accompanied by a converted liner to carry the technicians not on duty. Installation was also a very slow and tedious business, but by gigantic efforts it was completed in six months.

Then, to our dismay, we were confronted by another crisis. Nearly five thousand highly skilled men had been selected to serve the Analyzers and had been given an intensive course at the Technical Training Schools. At the end of seven months, 10 percent of them had had nervous breakdowns and only 40 per cent had qualified.

Once again, everyone started to blame everyone else. Norden, of course, said that the Research Staff could not be held responsible, and so incurred the enmity of the Personnel and Training Commands. It was finally decided that the only thing to do was to use two instead of four Analyzers and to bring the others into action as soon as men could be trained. There was little time to lose, for the enemy was still on the offensive and his morale was rising.

The first Analyzer fleet was ordered to recapture the system of Eriston. On the way, by one of the hazards of war, the liner carrying the technicians was struck by a roving mine. A warship would have survived, but the liner with its irreplaceable cargo was totally destroyed. So the operation had to be abandoned.

The other expedition was, at first, more successful. There was no doubt at all that the Analyzer fulfilled its designers’ claims, and the enemy was heavily defeated in the first engagements. He withdrew, leaving us in possession of Saphran, Leucon and Hexanerax. But his Intelligence Staff must have noted the change in our tactics and the inexplicable presence of a liner in the heart of our battlefleet. It must have noted, also, that our first fleet had been accompanied by a similar ship – and had withdrawn when it had been destroyed.

In the next engagement, the enemy used his superior numbers to launch an overwhelming attack on the Analyzer ship and its unarmed consort. The attack was made without regard to losses – both ships were, of course, very heavily protected – and it succeeded. The result was the virtual decapitation of the Fleet, since an effectual transfer to the old operational methods proved impossible. We disengaged under heavy fire, and so lost all our gains and also the systems of Lormyia, Ismarnus, Beronis, Alphanidon and Sideneus.

At this stage, Grand Admiral Taxaris expressed his disapproval of Norden by committing suicide, and I assumed supreme command.

The situation was now both serious and infuriating. With stubborn conservatism and complete lack of imagination, the enemy continued to advance with his old-fashioned and inefficient but now vastly more numerous ships. It was galling to realize that if we had only continued building, without seeking new weapons, we would have been in a far more advantageous position. There were many acrimonious conferences at which Norden defended the scientists while everyone else blamed them for all that had happened. The difficulty was that Norden had proved every one of his claims: he had a perfect excuse for all the disasters that had occurred. And we could not now turn back – the search for an irresistible weapon must go on. At first it had been a luxury that would shorten the war. Now it was a necessity if we were to end it victoriously.

We were on the defensive, and so was Norden. He was more than ever determined to reestablish his prestige and that of the Research Staff. But we had been twice disappointed, and would not make the same mistake again. No doubt Norden’s twenty thousand scientists would produce many further weapons: we would remain unimpressed.

We were wrong. The final weapon was something so fantastic that even now it seems difficult to believe that it ever existed. Its innocent, noncommittal name – The Exponential Field – gave no hint of its real potentialities. Some of Norden’s mathematicians had discovered it during a piece of entirely theoretical research into the properties of space, and to everyone’s great surprise their results were found to be physically realizable.

It seems very difficult to explain the operation of the Field to the layman. According to the technical description, it “produces an exponential condition of space, so that a finite distance in normal, linear space may become infinite in pseudo-space.” Norden gave an analogy which some of us found useful. It was as if one took a flat disk of rubber – representing a region of normal space – and then pulled its center out to infinity. The circumference of the disk would be unaltered – but its “diameter” would be infinite. That was the sort of thing the generator of the Field did to the space around it.

As an example, suppose that a ship carrying the generator was surrounded by a ring of hostile machines. If it switched on the Field, each of the enemy ships would think that it – and the ships on the far side of the circle – had suddenly receded into nothingness. Yet the circumference of the circle would be the same as before: only the journey to the center would be of infinite duration, for as one proceeded, distances would appear to become greater and greater as the “scale” of space altered.

It was a nightmare condition, but a very useful one. Nothing could reach a ship carrying the Field: it might be englobed by an enemy fleet yet would be as inaccessible as if it were at the other side of the Universe. Against this, of course, it could not fight back without switching off the Field, but this still left it at a very great advantage, not only in defense but in offense. For a ship fitted with the Field could approach an enemy fleet undetected and suddenly appear in its midst.

This time there seemed to be no flaws in the new weapon. Needless to say, we looked for all the possible objections before we committed ourselves again. Fortunately the equipment was fairly simple and did not require a large operating staff. After much debate, we decided to rush it into production, for we realized that time was running short and the war was going against us. We had now lost about the whole of our initial gains and enemy forces had made several raids into our own solar system.

We managed to hold off the enemy while the Fleet was reequipped and the new battle techniques were worked out. To use the Field operationally it was necessary to locate an enemy formation, set a course that would intercept it, and then switch on the generator for the calculated period of time. On releasing the Field again – if the calculations had been accurate – one would be in the enemy’s midst and could do great damage during the resulting confusion, retreating by the same route when necessary.

The first trial maneuvers proved satisfactory and the equipment seemed quite reliable. Numerous mock attacks were made and the crews became accustomed to the new technique. I was on one of the test flights and can vividly remember my impressions as the Field was switched on. The ships around us seemed to dwindle as if on the surface of an expanding bubble: in an instant they had vanished completely. So had the stars – but presently we could see that the Galaxy was still visible as a faint band of light around the ship. The virtual radius of our pseudo-space was not really infinite, but some hundred thousand light-years, and so the distance to the farthest stars of our system had not been greatly increased – though the nearest had of course totally disappeared. These training maneuvers, however, had to be canceled before they were completed, owing to a whole flock of minor technical troubles in various pieces of equipment, notably the communications circuits. These were annoying, but not important, though it was thought best to return to Base to clear them up.

At that moment the enemy made what was obviously intended to be a decisive attack against the fortress planet of Iton at the limits of our Solar System. The Fleet had to go into battle before repairs could be made.

The enemy must have believed that we had mastered the secret of invisibility – as in a sense we had. Our ships appeared suddenly out of no-where and inflicted tremendous damage – for a while. And then something quite baffling and inexplicable happened.

I was in command of the flagship Hircania when the trouble started. We had been operating as independent units, each against assigned objectives. Our detectors observed an enemy formation at medium range and the navigating officers measured its distance with great accuracy. We set course and switched on the generator.

The Exponential Field was released at the moment when we should have been passing through the center of the enemy group. To our consternation, we emerged into normal space at a distance of many hundred miles – and when we found the enemy, he had already found us. We retreated, and tried again. This time we were so far away from the enemy that he located us first.

Obviously, something was seriously wrong. We broke communicator silence and tried to contact the other ships of the Fleet to see if they had experienced the same trouble. Once again we failed – and this time the failure was beyond all reason, for the communication equipment appeared to be working perfectly. We could only assume, fantastic though it seemed, that the rest of the Fleet had been destroyed.

I do not wish to describe the scenes when the scattered units of the Fleet struggled back to Base. Our casualties had actually been negligible, but the ships were completely demoralized. Almost all had lost touch with one another and had found that their ranging equipment showed inexplicable errors. It was obvious that the Exponential Field was the cause of the troubles, despite the fact that they were only apparent when it was switched off.

The explanation came too late to do us any good, and Norden’s final discomfiture was small consolation for the virtual loss of the war. As I have explained, the Field generators produced a radial distortion of space, distances appearing greater and greater as one approached the center of the artificial pseudo-space. When the Field was switched off, conditions returned to normal.

But not quite. It was never possible to restore the initial state exactly. Switching the Field on and off was equivalent to an elongation and contraction of the ship carrying the generator, but there was a hysteretic effect, as it were, and the initial condition was never quite reproducible, owing to all the thousands of electrical changes and movements of mass aboard the ship while the Field was on. These asymmetries and distortions were cumulative, and though they seldom amounted to more than a fraction of one per cent, that was quite enough. It meant that the precision ranging equipment and the tuned circuits in the communication apparatus were thrown completely out of adjustment. Any single ship could never detect the change – only when it compared its equipment with that of another vessel, or tried to communicate with it, could it tell what had happened.

It is impossible to describe the resultant chaos. Not a single component of one ship could be expected with certainty to work aboard another. The very nuts and bolts were no longer interchangeable, and the supply position became quite impossible. Given time, we might even have overcome these difficulties, but the enemy ships were already attacking in thousands with weapons which now seemed centuries behind those that we had invented. Our magnificent Fleet, crippled by our own science, fought on as best it could until it was overwhelmed and forced to surrender. The ships fitted with the Field were still invulnerable, but as fighting units they were almost helpless. Every time they switched on their generators to escape from enemy attack, the permanent distortion of their equipment increased. In a month, it was all over.

THIS IS THE true story of our defeat, which I give without prejudice to my defense before this Court. I make it, as I have said, to counteract the libels that have been circulating against the men who fought under me, and to show where the true blame for our misfortunes lay. Finally, my request, which as the Court will now realize I make in no frivolous manner and which I hope will therefore be granted. The Court will be aware that the conditions under which we are housed and the constant surveillance to which we are subjected night and day are somewhat distressing. Yet I am not complaining of this: nor do I complain of the fact that shortage of accommodation has made it necessary to house us in pairs. But I cannot be held responsible for my future actions if I am compelled any longer to share my cell with Professor Norden, late Chief of the Research Staff of my armed forces.

Beef nachos

FEEDS SIX!

INGREDIENTS

Sauce

  • 3 teaspoons cumin seeds
  • 3 teaspoons coriander seeds
  • 2 tablespoons extra virgin olive oil
  • 500g beef mince
  • 1 red onion, finely chopped
  • 1/4 teaspoon ground cinnamon
  • 5cm strip orange rind
  • 400g can crushed tomatoes
  • 185ml (3/4 cup) water
  • 400g red kidney beans, drained, rinsed
  • 2 x 175g pkts plain corn chips
  • 160g (2 cups) coarsely grated cheddar
  • Sour cream, to serve
  • Sliced fresh red chilli or green chilli, to serve
  • Refried beans (optional)

GUACAMOLE

  • 2 avocados, coarsely chopped
  • 1 fresh green jalapen~o, deseeded, finely chopped
  • 1/4 white onion, finely chopped
  • 2 tablespoons fresh coriander, chopped
  • 2 teaspoons fresh lime juice

TOMATO SALSA

  • 2 tomatoes, finely chopped
  • 1/2 small red onion, finely chopped
  • 1/2 cup fresh coriander, chopped
  • 2 teaspoons fresh lime juice

METHOD

  1. Fry the cumin and coriander in a frying pan over medium heat for 1-2 minutes or until aromatic. Transfer to a mortar and pound with a pestle until coarsely crushed.
  2. Heat the oil in a large frying pan over medium-high heat. Add the mince and cook, breaking it up with a wooden spoon, for 5 minutes or until browned. Add the onion and cook, stirring, for 5 minutes or until soft.
  3. Add the cumin mixture, cinnamon and orange rind. Cook for 1 minute or until aromatic.
  4. Add the tomato, water and half the beans. Reduce the heat to low and simmer for 20 minutes or until the sauce reduces and thickens. Stir in the remaining beans.
  5. Preheat the oven to 180 degrees (160 fan forced)
  6. Meanwhile, for the guacamole, place the avocado in a bowl. Use a fork to roughly mash. Add jalapeño, onion, coriander and lime and stir until well combined. Season.
  7. To make the salsa, combine all the ingredients in a bowl. Season.
  8. Spread the corn chips over a baking tray. Bake for 10 minutes or until warmed through.
  9. Heat the refried beans
  10. Preheat the oven grill on medium-high. Transfer corn chips to 4 ovenproof dishes. Spoon beef mixture over and sprinkle with cheese. Grill for 2-3 minutes or until cheese melts. Top with guacamole, tomato salsa and sour cream. Serve with sliced chilli.

Beetroot salad

Ingredients

  • 500g Beetroot, raw, peeled, grated
  • 700g Carrots, raw, peeled, grated
  • 1 cup Mint leaves, roughly chopped
  • 1/2 cup Raisins
  • 1/4 cup Sunflower seeds, toasted
  • 1/4 cup Pumpkin seeds, toasted
  • 1/2 tsp Salt

Dressing

  • 2 Tbsp Balsamic vinegar
  • 2 Tbsp Pomegranate molasses
  • 1/4 cup Orange juice
  • 1/4 cup Olive oil
  • 1 Tbsp Honey

Method

  1. To prepare the dressing, place all the ingredients in a jar with a tight fitting lid. Shake and combine.
  2. To prepare the salad, in a large serving bowl combine the beetroot, carrot, mint, raisins, seeds, and salt. Mix.
  3. Pour dressing over the salad. Toss again when ready to serve.

Victoria Sponge Cake

Victoria sponge cake

Ingredients

  • 4 free range eggs
  • 2/3 cup caster sugar
  • 1 teaspoon vanilla essence
  • 1 cup self-raising flour
  • 150ml cream, whipped
  • 1/2 cup strawberry jam
  • 3 tablespoons icing sugar mixture
  • 250g strawberries, hulled and halved

Method

  1. Preheat oven to 180C or 160C fan. Lightly grease 2 x 20cm (base measurement) round cake tins and line the bases with non-stick baking paper. Using electric beaters, beat eggs in a large bowl for 5 mins, until thick, pale and increased in volume. Add sugar, 2 tbsp at a time, beating well after each addition. Beat in vanilla.
  2. Sift flour over egg mixture. Using a large metal spoon or rubber spatula, fold in until combined, taking care not to lose volume. Divide evenly between prepared tins.
  3. Bake for 18-20 mins, until the cakes spring back to a light touch in the centre. Cool in tin for 5 mins, then turn out onto a wire rack and peel away the paper. Leave to cool
  4. Place 1 cake onto a serving plate and pipe or dollop with the whipped cream. Spread the other sponge with jam and invert onto the bottom cake. Put icing sugar into a small sieve and dust top of cake. Top with strawberries.

Lemonade Scones

Lemonade Scones

Ingredients

  • 3 1/2 cups of self-raising flour
  • 1 Cup of double cream
  • 1 cup of lemonade

Method

  1. Pre-heat oven to 200 degrees celcius
  2. Put all the ingredients in a large bowl
  3. Stir enough for ingredients to be thoroughly mixed but no more than you have to to make the dough
  4. Sprinkle flour (self-raising or plain) on the bench to make an area where you can roll the dough
  5. Spread dough on the floured surface, and roll out to about 2 or 3 cm thick
  6. Prepare the baking tray where you will cook the scones by putting baking paper on it so the scones don’t stick
  7. Cut into scone-size pieces and place on the baking tray (make sure there is enough space around each scone for it to grow
  8. Put the tray in the oven for about 20 or 25 minutes

Eating

Fun fact: Traditionally scones are eaten with jam and cream. This works really well, but jam can be replaced with chocolate spread or honey. Banana also works well instead of, or as well as, cream.

Gingerbread

Gingerbread has been around for centuries; the gingerbread fair in Paris dates back to the 11th Century. Gingerbread figures were originally made as pigs and later developed into little men.
This recipe makes crispy gingerbread biscuits that are perfect for gingerbread shapes. They can stand up to plenty of dunking because of their crispy texture.

Ingredients

  • 2 ½ cups plain flour, sifted
  • 1 tsp baking soda
  • 125g butter
  • ½ cup brown sugar
  • ½ cup golden syrup
  • 2 tsps ground ginger
  • ½ tsp ground cinnamon
  • 1 tsp ground nutmeg
  • ½ tsp ground cloves

Method

  1. Cream butter and sugar until pale and fluffy. Add the golden syrup and sift in the flour, baking soda and spices. Mix to form a smooth dough.
  2. Divide the dough in half and wrap in plastic film, refrigerate for at least 30 minutes or until firm.
  3. Preheat oven to 190oC.
  4. Roll out the dough between sheets of non-stick baking paper to 5mm thickness. Cut out shapes with a gingerbread man cookie cutter. Place on a baking tray lined with baking paper.
  5. Bake for 8 minutes or until golden. Place on a cake rack, cool then decorate.

The gingerbread biscuits will not change much in colour whilst baking – take care not to burn them!

Christmas Pudding Ice-Cream

Ingredients

  • christmas pudding
  • vanilla ice cream.

Method

  1. The ratio is about 4 parts ice cream to one part christmas pudding. Maybe 5 parts if people are unsure about it.
  2. Pudding into the food processor first.
  3. Quick whizz to break it up. Not mush!
  4. Break ice cream in around the bowl evenly and blend til just mixed. Refreeze.
  5. Take it out a good 5 mins before you want to use it.

Why The Worst Is Still Ahead For Turkey’s Bubble Economy

MAR 5, 2014 @ 03:36 PM

The explosive rise of Turkey’s economy in the past decade is one of the most fascinating growth stories of all time. Since 2002, Turkey’s economy nearly quadrupled in size on the back of an epic boom in consumption and construction that led to the building of countless malls, skyscrapers, and ambitious infrastructure projects. Like many emerging economies in the past decade, Turkey’s economy continued to grow virtually unabated through the Global Financial Crisis, while most Western economies stagnated.
Unfortunately, like most emerging market nations, Turkey’s economic boom has devolved into a dangerous bubble that is similar to the bubbles that caused the downfall of Western economies just six years ago. Though Turkey has received significant attention after its currency and financial markets fell sharply in the past year, there is still very little awareness of the country’s economic bubble itself and its frightening implications.

Turkish flag (Photo credit: quinn.anya)

The emerging markets bubble began in 2009, shortly after China pursued an aggressive credit-driven infrastructure-based growth strategy to boost its economy during the global financial crisis. China’s economic growth immediately surged as construction activity increased dramatically, which drove a global raw materials boom that created a windfall for commodities exporting countries such as Australia and emerging markets. Emerging markets’ improving fortunes began to attract the attention of global investors who were seeking to diversify away from Western nations that were at the epicenter of the financial crisis. As the bubble progressed, even developing countries that were not significant commodities exporters (such as Turkey) began to benefit from the growing interest in this investment theme.
Rock-bottom interest rates in the U.S., Europe, and Japan, combined with the U.S. Federal Reserve’s multi-trillion dollar quantitative easing programs, encouraged a $4 trillion torrent of speculative “hot money” to flow into emerging market investments over the last several years. A global carry trade arose in which investors borrowed at low interest rates from the U.S. and Japan, invested the funds in high-yielding emerging market assets, and pocketed the interest rate differential or spread. Soaring demand for EM assets led to a bond bubble and ultra-low borrowing costs, which resulted in government-driven infrastructure booms, alarmingly fast credit growth, and property bubbles in numerous developing nations.
Like many other emerging nations, Turkey’s economic boom since the financial crisis has been heavily predicated upon a combination of foreign “hot money” inflows, ultra-low interest rates across the yield curve, rapid credit growth, and soaring asset prices. The charts of Turkey’s benchmark interest rate and three-month interbank rate show how they were cut to all-time lows in the years following the financial crisis:

Turkey Benchmark Interest Rate
Turkey’s idiosyncratic monetary policy of the past half-decade was responsible for these unusually low interest rates: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s Prime Minister, believes that a zero real interest rate policy is the best practical implementation of sharia law’s ban on usury, or lending for interest, for modern Islamic societies.
“We aim to cut the real interest rate in the long run, so people will increase their incomes through working, not through interest,” he said in 2011. “Eventually we aim to equalize the interest rate and inflation rate.”
Turkey’s Economic “Miracle” Is Driven By A Credit Bubble
Ultra-low interest rates are, of course, notorious for creating temporary economic booms that are driven by credit and asset bubbles – a fact that likely wasn’t lost on Erdoğan, who vowed to make Turkey one of the world’s ten largest economies by 2023. Loans to Turkey’s private sector have more than quadrupled since 2008, even though the country’s real GDP only increased by approximately a third (and a good portion of that GDP increase was driven by debt):
turkey-loans-to-private-sector-4
Turkey’s M3 money supply – a broad measure of total money and credit in the economy – shows a similar ominous increase:
turkey-money-supply-m3-4
The emerging markets bond bubble enabled a corporate borrowing spree that caused Turkey’s external debt, or debt owed to foreign creditors, to surge to a record high of U.S.$372.6 billion or nearly 47 percent of the country’s GDP:

Continued from page 1 turkey-external-debt 90 percent of Turkish corporate debt is denominated in foreign currencies, which dangerously exposes the country’s corporate borrowers to weakness in the Turkish lira currency, which is down by over 18 percent against the U.S. dollar in the past year: TurkeyForeignDebt (2) Even more worrisome is the fact that U.S. $129.1 billion, or just over a third, of Turkey’s external debt is short-term debt that will come due in the next year, which is a sharp increase from the country’s short-term external debt of U.S. $100.6 billion at the end of 2012, and U.S. $52.52 billion external debt in 2008. Turkey’s short-term and long-term external debt have both increased at a faster rate than economic growth in the past half-decade. Having a large stock of short-term external debt makes economies more vulnerable to rising interest rates, as many emerging market nations have experienced in the past year after the U.S. Federal Reserve’s QE taper plans surfaced. Turkey’s short-term external debt burden exceeds 100 percent of its currency reserves, making it one of the highest risk emerging economies based on this metric. One of the reasons for Turkey’s rapid accumulation of external debt in the past decade has been the need to finance its growing current account deficit, which the country’s economy has become increasingly reliant upon to continue growing: turkey-current-account Turkey’s current account deficit to GDP ratio has swelled to over 6 percent – a level that has led to currency crises in the past: turkey-current-account-to-gdp Turkey’s Consumption Boom Is Actually A Bubble Accounting for 70 percent of Turkey’s GDP, consumer spending has been the country’s primary engine of economic growth in the past decade. Unfortunately, much of this consumer spending has been financed by debt, as with many other areas of Turkey’s economy. Personal loans grew at a scorching 61 percent average annual rate from 2005 to 2008 and barely slowed down after the financial crisis, while loans to households were increasing at a 28 percent annual rate in 2013. Credit is so free-flowing in Turkey that consumers are even able to receive approvals for personal loans via text message and ATM machines. In addition to personal loans, credit card debt has played a significant role in enabling Turkey’s consumption boom, with credit card loans from the country’s leading banks having risen by 77 percent from 2010 to mid-2013. Turkey’s 74 million citizens now own 57 million credit cards and carry approximately $45 billion in outstanding credit card debt – nearly a third of which is considered to be nonperforming. Turkish consumers’ embrace of debt-driven consumption has caused household debt as a proportion of disposable income to rocket from 4.7 percent in 2002 to 50.4 percent in 2012. As is common in low interest rate and credit bubble environments, Turkey’s consumption boom has been abetted by a savings rate that has fallen to its lowest level in at least three decades, which places Turkey dead last among fourteen other developing countries for this metric. An IMF study found that the average developing country has a savings rate of 33.5 percent, which is nearly triple Turkey’s 12.6 percent savings rate. The combination of Turkey’s falling savings rate and credit binge has helped to propel the country’s consumer spending to an all-time high in the past decade: turkey-consumer-spending Turkish consumers have focused much of their discretionary spending on goods such as automobiles, consumer electronics, and household appliances. Numerous foreign multinational corporations have flocked to Turkey to profit from the country’s spending boom. Turkey Has A Property Bubble Like many other emerging market nations, Turkey’s frothy, low interest rate environment of the past half-decade has led to the inflation of property bubbles in major urban centers. Turkish housing prices have soared by nearly 53 percent since 2009: HousingBubble Source: GlobalPropertyGuide.com Turkey’s property bubble was driven by mortgage interest rates that have plunged from nearly 50 percent in 2002 to under 10 percent in 2013, which led to a more than sixfold increase in the country’s total outstanding mortgage loans since 2005: Mortgages Turkey’s ballooning mortgage bubble – which expanded by 28 percent last year alone – helped to finance a 78.7 percent increase in property sales in 2013, which has led to a bubble in residential construction activity in turn. Construction Plays A Key Role In Turkey’s Bubble Construction is one of the most common drivers of economic activity during bubbles, and Turkey’s bubble economy is no exception to this pattern. Now accounting for $170 billion or approximately 20 percent of Turkey’s $789.3 billion economy (when including related activities), construction of all types have been booming, particularly construction of residential buildings, malls, hotels, skyscrapers, airports and other massive infrastructure projects. Growing by 42.9 percent in 2013, construction-related loans are a major component of Turkey’s overall credit bubble. Since 2008, 39 new skyscrapers have been completed in Turkey, and there are 42 more skyscrapers currently under construction. After its completion in 2011, the 856-foot tall Istanbul Sapphire became both Turkey and Europe’s tallest building outside of Russian territory. Turkey’s skyscraper construction frenzy is a reason for alarm according to the Skyscraper Index, which posits that many of history’s worst economic crises – including the Great Depression and 1997 Asian financial crisis – were preceded by the building of record-breaking skyscrapers.

Sapphire Tower – the tallest building in Istanbul (Photo credit: Charkrem) Skyscraper booms and economic bubbles go hand-in-hand because excessive optimism combined with the availability of cheap credit leads to wildly ambitious, “pie in the sky” business decisions that are later regretted when the boom inevitably turns into a bust. Turkey’s skyscraper mania is funded in large part by the risky short-term U.S. dollar-denominated loans that were discussed earlier. Property development conglomerate Kiler Group – which owns the Istanbul Sapphire – had 164 million liras worth of debt in 2013, 154 million liras of which are U.S. dollar-denominated loans. Property development firms that have large amounts of dollar-denominated loans are dangerously exposed to adverse moves in the Turkish lira’s exchange rate against the U.S. dollar. Shopping mall development is another important facet of Turkey’s construction bubble: Turkey had only 46 malls in 2000, but now has over 300, and there are plans to build at least 300 more in the next decade. 1.5 million square meters of shopping space is expected to come online in 2014, representing an 18 percent increase in Turkey’s total shopping mall space. Turkey’s mall construction bubble is being encouraged by the country’s unsustainable credit-driven consumer spending boom that was discussed earlier. As with malls, there has been an explosion of new hotels built in Turkey in the past decade, and many more are in the pipeline. In the next three years, 65 new four and five star hotels with a total number of 38,853 beds are expected to be completed. Western hotel companies have been clamoring to get a piece of the hotel bubble action: Hilton Worldwide had 20 hotels under construction in 2013, Radisson has 15 Park Inn properties planned, while Wyndham has 9 more Ramadas, an additional Wyndham, and 20 Super 8 hotels planned, to name just a few examples. According to Mehmet Onkal of BDO Hospitality Consulting, 95 percent of Turkey’s hotel projects are funded by local investors. Ambitious government-led infrastructure projects have been a significant driver of Turkey’s construction activity and economic growth as well. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is the mastermind behind Turkey’s decade-long, $200 billion construction plan that includes mega projects such as:

  • A third airport in Istanbul that is expected to be one of the world’s largest when it opens in 2019. Costing an estimated $29 billion, this is currently Turkey’s most expensive mega project
  • A 26-mile shipping canal to link the Marmara and the Black Sea, which is expected to cost $15 billion
  • A 24-tower public-private real estate development that will contain approximately 5,000 luxury apartments, at a cost of $8.4 billion
  • A $5 billion rail tunnel that will run under the Bosporus
  • A third bridge across the Bosporus that will cost $4.4 billion
  • A $2.6 billion financial center complex for the central bank, financial regulators, and private financial firms
  • A $2.5 billion luxury high-rise that includes a hotel, a new mall, office space, and a spacious performing arts center
  • A large new tunnel under the Bosporus that will cost $1.4 billion
  • A $1.35 billion development with two marinas, two five-star hotels, a massive mall, and a 1,000-capacity mosque
  • A $700 million ship port, along with luxury hotels and offices
  • A $180 million luxury hotel and office skyscraper called the Diamond of Istanbul that will replace the Istanbul Sapphire as Turkey’s tallest building when completed

Public construction projects are the primary reason why Turkey’s government spending has increased by nearly two-thirds in the past decade: turkey-government-spending Turkey’s construction boom has been rife with corruption and scandals involving allies of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. On December 17th 2013, news of a 15-month secret investigation broke that led to the arrest or questioning of over 100 people. Among those people were sons of three of Erdogan’s cabinet ministers, the CEO of a state-run bank, and a construction tycoon who has become one of the wealthiest men in Turkey thanks to the country’s bubble economy of the past decade. The allegations against those arrested range from taking bribes to bid rigging. Millions of dollars in cash have been found in some of the homes of the accused. Erdoğan dismissed the criminal investigations of his allies as a plot by foreign interests to hamper and detract from Turkey’s economic boom. Turkey’s Bubble Has Created An Illusion Of Prosperity Turkey’s inflating bubble economy has helped the country’s GDP to nearly quadruple in a little over a decade: GDP Source: World Bank Turkey’s stock market soared by ninefold from 2003 to its peak in early 2013, and is still up by sixfold despite the recent market rout: turkey-stock-market Booming stock and property prices have led to a surge in the number of wealthy Turks since 2002, including a 10.5 percent increase in the number of ultra-wealthy individuals with net assets of $30 million and above in 2013. Turkey now has the world’s seventh highest number of billionaires according to Forbes’ billionaire list. Many of Turkey’s new billionaires hail from the finance and construction sectors, which are typical epicenters of wealth generation during credit-driven economic bubbles. Though traditionally an emerging market, Turkey’s frothy economic boom has recently led to its reclassification as a newly industrialized country by economists and is considered to be a developed country by the CIA. Turkey is a member of the MINT, CIVET, and Next Eleven groups of emerging economies that are being touted as the next BRICs, which is an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Many of the countries in the aforementioned groups are experiencing economic bubbles of their own and are part of the overall emerging markets bubble. Cracks Are Beginning To Show Turkey’s economy and financial markets were sailing fairly smoothly until a perfect storm of events in late-May 2013 caused a change of sentiment virtually overnight. From late-2012 until May 2013, Turkey’s financial markets had levitated on a new wave of liquidity that was provided by the U.S. Federal Reserve’s $85 billion per month QE3 program and Japan’s new Abenomicsstimulus program. In the spring of 2013, rumors of an upcoming tapering or downsizing of the Fed’s QE3 program began to put global financial markets on edge – particularly those that were the greatest beneficiaries of the Fed’s liquidity such as emerging markets and bonds. With markets already uneasy over QE3 taper rumors, one catalyst was all that was needed to send Turkey, and soon the rest of emerging markets, reeling: a wave of protests and riots began in Turkey on May 28th 2013 over a slew of discontent that had built up despite the country’s booming economy. Often compared to the Occupy protests and movement, Turkish protesters expressed their dismay over numerous environmental issues that resulted from the country’s construction boom, excessive use of police force, the lack of freedom of speech and right to assembly, government encroachment of the country’s secularism, and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s authoritarianism. 3.5 million of Turkey’s 80 million people took part in the protests, which resulted in 11 deaths, over 8,000 injuries, and more than 3,000 arrests.

Protests in Istanbul (Photo credit: Daniel Etter/Redux) The combination of QE3 taper speculation, the persistent current account deficit, and civil unrest, led to a sharp loss of confidence that caused Turkey’s stock market to plunge by over 25 percent in just one month, sparked a selloff in the Turkish lira currency, and caused 10 year Turkish government bond yields to spike from 6 percent to 10 percent. I predicted the turmoil in Turkey and other emerging markets just a few months before it started in a report that I wrote when I was a contributor to Business Insider called “All The Money We’re Pouring Into Emerging Markets Has Created a Massive Bubble.” Turkey’s financial markets stabilized after their spring rout until December 2013, when the country’s corruption scandal came to light and the Fed’s imminent QE taper caused the Turkish lira to crash by over 12 percent to a record low against the U.S. dollar, bringing the currency’s total loss for the year to nearly 22 percent: Lira Turkey’s latest turmoil led to its categorization as one of the “Fragile Five” emerging economies, which also includes South Africa, Brazil, Indonesia, and India. The Fragile Five experienced the most pain among emerging markets since the spring 2013 because of their large current account and trade deficits, high inflation, significant dependence on foreign capital inflows, and slowing economic growth. To shore up Turkey’s currency after its sharp decline, Prime Minister Erdoğan was finally forced to give in to the demands of a group of Turkish leaders that he called the interest rate lobby” that he had long battled against due to their calls for higher interest rates. On January 28th 2014, Turkish Central Bank Governor Erdem Basci – a member of the so-called interest rate lobby” – surprised the world when he ordered dramatic hikes of the overnight lending rate from 7.75 to 12.5 percent, the overnight borrowing rate from 3.5 percent to 8 percent, and the benchmark one-week repurchase rate from 4.5 percent to 10 percent: turkey-interest-rateturkey-interbank-rateThe World Is Still Unaware Of Turkey’s Economic Bubble Though Turkish and international financial markets initially cheered January’s surprise rate hikes, I view this as evidence that the world is still unaware that Turkey’s economic boom is actually a credit-driven bubble that is predicated on ultra-low interest rates, both foreign and domestic. Falling interest rates helped to inflate Turkey’s bubble economy, and rising interest rates will put an end to it. This is a very simple concept, yet so few people understand it – even after the events of 2008. I see even more evidence that the world is largely unaware of Turkey’s economic bubble in the fact that the vast majority of the recent discourse about Turkey’s problems is myopically focused on the country’s current account deficit and currency weakness, while virtually ignoring the risks posed by the eventual popping of Turkey’s credit bubble. I believe that this myopia is caused by denial of the existence of Turkey’s economic bubble in the first place, along with a mental block that is causing economists and commentators to focus too much on a 1997-style currency crisis, as if that is the only possible template for emerging market crises to follow. It is important to remember that history doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme. The popping of the overall emerging markets bubble will cause a very severe global economic crisis, but it is wrong to expect this crisis to play out identically to the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Like snowflakes, no two economic crises are the same. Contrary to popular belief, Turkey’s currency weakness is not a new phenomenon, as it has been a consistent trend for the last six years: Lira Despite the Turkish lira’s downtrend of the past six years, Turkey’s credit and asset bubble has continued to inflate to dizzying new heights, as it has also done since the spring 2013 panic. I am certainly not denying the risks posed by the Turkish lira’s rout, but I do not believe that Turkey’s economic bubble has truly popped yet. The lira’s weakness is the precursor to Turkey’s coming economic bust, but it is not “The Crisis” in and of itself. Lack of awareness and understanding of the implications of Turkey’s credit-driven bubble economy is the reason why most mainstream economists and commentators are still relatively optimistic on the country’s long-term economic prospects, even if they concede that growth will slow. Unfortunately, credit bubbles of the magnitude of Turkey’s do not end in a mere economic slowdown, but in a crisis. How Turkey’s Economic Bubble Will Pop Turkey’s economic bubble is likely to pop as a result of rising short and long-term interest rates, and may coincide with the popping of the overall emerging markets bubble. As the U.S. Federal Reserve follows through with its QE taper – which is expected to be completed this year – the flow of “hot money” to emerging markets will reverse, which will cause those countries’ currencies to decline and bond yields to climb. Turkey’s $129.1 billion short-term external debt that will come due over the next year is an additional related catalyst that will likely contribute to the popping of the country’s bubble. Here is what to expect when Turkey’s economic bubble truly pops:

  • The country’s runaway credit boom will turn into a bust
  • Countless construction and property development projects will turn sour
  • Many banks and property developers will go under
  • Many corporations that have large foreign currency debts will default
  • Over-leveraged consumers will default on their debts
  • Economic growth will go into reverse
  • Unemployment will surge
  • Government and corporate debt downgrades by rating agencies
  • Property, the lira currency, stock, and bond prices will fall significantly, leading to higher interest rates
  • Political backlash against the current leaders and more public protests

Credit-driven construction and consumption have been Turkey’s two main engines of economic growth in the past decade, and the inevitable ending of those unsustainable booms will leave the country without a viable source of growth. The popping of the overall emerging markets bubble will likely lead to a crisis that is worse than the 1997 Asian financial crisis because more countries are involved (Latin America, China, and Africa) this time, and because the global economy is in a much weaker state now than it was during the booming late-1990s. I will end this report with my favorite quote from economist Ludwig Von Mises:

“There is no means of avoiding the final collapse of a boom brought about by credit expansion. The alternative is only whether the crisis should come sooner as a result of a voluntary abandonment of further credit expansion, or later as a final and total catastrophe of the currency system involved.”

The Battle for Turkey’s Future

An increasingly autocratic prime minister is losing touch with voters and damaging his country

RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN has reason to thank Vladimir Putin. For weeks the Russian president’s attack on Ukraine has hogged headlines. This has let Turkey’s prime minister get away with only limited international opprobrium for a string of illiberal laws that seem designed mainly to protect himself and his allies from a corruption scandal that one insider calls the biggest in modern Turkish history.

Since the scandal broke in mid-December, when police raided the homes of several sons of ministers, illicit recordings have emerged on the internet supposedly implicating Mr Erdogan, his relatives and others in dodgy dealings. Mr Erdogan has denounced these as fabrications, and blamed a network of judges, prosecutors and police linked to Fethullah Gulen, a powerful Sunni Muslim cleric based in Pennsylvania. (The irony that Mr Gulen was an ally of Mr Erdogan in his previous legal battles against the army and the secularists has not escaped Turks.)

Mr Erdogan has reassigned or sacked hundreds of policemen, judges and prosecutors, stalling the investigation. He has passed laws giving the government greater control over the judiciary and security services, clamped down on the media and tightened internet regulation. His latest move was to get the internet regulator, a former spook, briefly to ban Twitter, and he has often threatened other social media as well (see article).

Mounting criticism of the prime minister has left him unmoved, just as it did after he unleashed a brutal police assault on protesters in Istanbul’s Gezi Park last summer. Besides attacking Gulenists and protesters, he has responded with digs at the foreign media and a purported “interest-rate lobby” (in January the central bank doubled its rates to 10%). And he defiantly declared that the Twitter ban showed to the world the strength of the republic.

Above all, Mr Erdogan relies on one overarching claim: that he has the support of voters. Ever since his Justice and Development (AK) party was catapulted to power in November 2002, its electoral success has been impressive. AK’s share of the vote rose to 47% in 2007 and almost 50% in 2011 (though it fell below 40% in municipal elections in 2009). Mr Erdogan has adopted a fiercely majoritarian attitude: so long as voters back him, he is entitled to do whatever he wants, heedless of opponents, protesters, judges, prosecutors or Europe. In a country with weak institutions and few checks and balances, such a view inevitably tends to authoritarianism.

On March 30th the prime minister’s support among Turkish voters will be put to the test, for the first time since the Gezi protests and the corruption probe, in municipal elections. Mr Erdogan has explicitly turned these into a referendum on himself and his party. If AK does well, which most analysts reckon means winning over 40% of the vote and keeping control of both Ankara and Istanbul, Mr Erdogan will claim vindication for his tough policies.

The outcome is highly uncertain. The main opposition parties, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) are weak. AK remains very strong in its Anatolian heartland, which includes such cities as Bursa, Kayseri and Konya. But Mr Erdogan’s approval rating has fallen over the past year. The CHP is quietly confident of winning Ankara, and it even hopes to upset AK in Istanbul, the city where Mr Erdogan began his political career. If AK does that badly, one minister predicts, it might even split.

Besides his 11 years in office, Gezi and the corruption cases, another reason why some Turks are tiring of Mr Erdogan is the economy. During AK’s time in power, GDP per head has tripled in real terms. After a sharp drop in 2009, growth bounced back to China-like levels in 2010 and 2011 (see chart). But this year it may be barely above 3%. The IMF reckons trend growth has dropped from 7% to 3%, too low to stop unemployment rising. Turkey also has the biggest current-account deficit in the OECD rich-country club, making it vulnerable to a loss of foreign confidence. Not surprisingly the lira has tumbled, shedding some 24% of its value against the dollar since last April and pushing up inflation.

Mehmet Simsek, the finance minister, rejects warnings about the economy as alarmist. He says all emerging markets have suffered since America signalled that interest rates might start rising. The current account was hit by high gold imports. Worries about corporate exposure to foreign-currency debt are exaggerated: most is owed by the biggest exporters. For the long term, he talks of better infrastructure, education (he points to 400,000 extra teachers and 210,000 extra classrooms) and more investment in R&D. He notes that Turkey has climbed from 71st to 44th in the World Economic Forum’s competitiveness table.

Yet Turkey’s weaknesses are obvious. Female participation in the workforce is the lowest in the OECD. Inequality is alarmingly high. Turkey comes a lowly 69th in the World Bank’s “Doing Business” rankings. In many ways it is in a middle-income trap: the low-cost advantage that the Anatolian tigers had in textiles, furniture, white goods and carmaking has been eroded by rising wages (and prices), but productivity and skills are not good enough to switch easily to higher-value production.

Above all is the uncertainty about Turkey’s political direction. Although the new European Union minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, talks of 2014 as the year of the EU, he concedes that popular support for EU membership has fallen from 70% in 2005 to only 40% today. In truth EU membership talks are stalled, and they are unlikely to revive soon, not least because Mr Erdogan has lost interest. He is also said to have become more dismissive of Turkey’s NATO membership. Losing the EU anchor, in particular, worries businessmen. Muharrem Yilmaz, chairman of Tusiad, the industrialists’ lobby, complains that the government did not take advantage of EU membership talks to strengthen political and economic institutions, and that its reform momentum has run out.

What might Mr Erdogan do next? He had hoped to stand for president in August, when the term of the incumbent, Abdullah Gul, a co-founder of AK, runs out. Mr Gul, who has avoided clashing directly with Mr Erdogan but made clear his unhappiness with his restrictive laws, could then become prime minister. But recent events have reduced the chances of Mr Erdogan stepping up to the presidency, not least because he has been unable to amend the constitution to give the job greater powers. So he may prefer to let Mr Gul run again and instead scrap the internal AK party rule against any MP running for a fourth term. That would let him stay on as prime minister and perhaps bring forward the general election due next year.

Yet such a move would only confirm criticism of Mr Erdogan’s autocratic ways. Some even draw analogies with Mr Putin’s desire for a fourth term as Russian president. Aykan Erdemir, a young CHP MP, says the situation makes him think of other embattled leaders in their bunkers, surrounded by yes-men. Put simply, the prime minister lacks an exit strategy. It would be better for his country if he found one.

Bruce2017-07-07 22:06:41publishpostopenTurkey